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JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE REHNQUIST
COURT: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT
DAVID R. Dow,1 CASSANDRA JEU, 2 AND ANTHONY C. COVENY3
INTRODUCTION
Enough time has passed since the death of William H.
Rehnquist that we are able to evaluate the Court that bore his
name with a sense of historical detachment. Shortly after the
Chief Justice's death, a number of articles appeared that ad-
dressed the jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court. Entire sym-
posia have now taken stock of the legal changes wrought during
Rehnquist's tenure. By and large, these articles have identified
data which support the assessment that, in the area of federal-
ism, the Rehnquist Court was aggressive, radical, and ideologi-
cal. 4
At the same time, the radicalism of the Rehnquist Court in the
area of federalism is, by now, conventional wisdom, and the nar-
row focus of these numerous studies on the issue of federalism
has obscured notable features of the Rehnquist Court's voting
behavior in other distinct domains. In the analysis presented
here, we try to correct this narrow focus.
University Distinguished Professor, University of Houston Law Center. We thank the
University of Houston Law Foundation for financial support, a decade's worth of students
in my Supreme Court seminar who helped gather and analyze the material we present in
this Article, and Aaron Fountain, our superb research assistant. We are also grateful for
the opportunity to discuss the ideas in this article in workshops at the University of
Houston, Florida State, Tulsa University, and the University of Nevada at Las Vegas.
2 Deputy Director, Texas Innocence Network and Adjunct Professor, University of
Houston Law Center.
3 Assistant Professor of Political Science, Prairie View A&M University.
4 Representative works include: Frank B. Cross & Stefanie Lindquist, The Decisional
Significance of the Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1665 (2006); THE REHNQUIST COURT:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT (Herman Schwartz ed., Hill & Wang 2002). Perhaps the
most comprehensive analysis is contained in Lori A Ringhand, Judicial Activism: An Em-
pirical Examination of Voting Behavior on the Rehnquist Natural Court, 24 CONST.
COMMENT. 43 (2007).
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We collected data from the last ten years of the Rehnquist
Court. This data demonstrates a predictable contrast between
the federalism cases, on the one hand, and individual rights
cases on the other. In the aggregate, the data reveals that virtu-
ally no members of the Court, including those who most vocally
express unease concerning the institution of judicial review, ad-
here to a consistent methodology in constitutional adjudication.
At the same time, there is a consistency in the inconsistency of
individual Justices-what might be called a "consistent inconsis-
tency." This consistent inconsistency makes it possible to predict
a Justice's individual votes with a high degree of confidence.
Much of the recent scholarship that has analyzed voting among
the Justices on the Rehnquist Court has been extraordinarily
comprehensive. 5 In our view, the lacuna in the current scholar-
ship is not a shortage of data. Rather, the two limitations in the
current scholarship are that (1) there has been no statistical
analysis of the Justices' voting patterns, and (2) there has been
no significant effort to employ statistical analysis to predict judi-
cial behavior. In this article, we seek to cure these limitations.
Using statistical analysis of the Justices' votes in more than 150
cases, additional support is provided to the well-trod claim that
the Supreme Court, under Chief Justice Rehnquist's steward-
ship, was highly activist in the body of constitutional cases that
turned on issues of federalism. In addition, using further analy-
sis, the Rehnquist Court is also shown to have been notably ac-
tivist in certain other domains, including cases raising claims of
religious liberty.
I. DEFINITIONS AND NOMENCLATURE
At the outset, one should acknowledge the obvious truth that
the title of this Article makes no sense. It is now widely known
5 See, e.g., THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE
ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM (University of Chicago Press 2004) (positing
conservative influences of Rehnquist Court parallel liberal influences of Warren Court in
terms of judicial activism); Ruth Colker & Kevin M. Scott, Dissing States?: Invalidation of
State Action During the Rehnquist Era, 88 VA. L. REV. 1301 (2002) (discussing perceived
"federalism revolution" in the Rehnquist Court's treatment of federal action); Ringhand,
supra note 4 (presenting empirical analysis of Supreme Court Justice voting behavior
during the Rehnquist Court).
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that there is really no such thing as "judicial activism."6 Scholars
on the left, the right, and in the center use the term as if it is
meaningful,7 but it is not. Rather than describing a particular
mode of judicial analysis, the term "judicial activism" refers to a
judicial outcome to which someone (namely the person using the
term) generally objects. Hence, a judicial activist is a judge who,
in the eyes of her critics, decides cases the wrong way. Although
the epithet "judicial activist" is often followed by a claim that
judges should not "legislate from the bench" and that they should
"interpret rather than create" law,8 these claims are diversionary
and merely rhetorical. Such claims are diversionary and rhetori-
cal since everyone agrees that judges should interpret rather
than legislate, and that is what all judges purport to be doing. If
an interpretation is wrong, however, it does not automatically
transform into something other than an interpretation. In short,
characterizing a judge as a judicial activist does not reveal any-
thing about that judge's methodology.
6 See generally Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Ju-
dicial Activism," 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441 (2004) (defining "judicial activism" via comprehen-
sive historical overview of term).
7 See Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1139, 1139-40 (2002) (explaining popularity of making "conservative judicial activism"
accusations against Rehnquist Court as a function of political "payback" for conservative
criticism of Warren Court); see also Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Judicial Conservatism v.
a Principled Judicial Activism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 273, 273-76 (1987) (positing
that judicial conservatives endorse judicial restraint while judicial liberals prefer a more
activist role for the judiciary); Steven G. Calabresi, 2005 Survey of Books Related to the
Law: The Originalist and Normative Case Against Judicial Activism: A Reply to Professor
Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1081 (2005) (reviewing RANDY E. BARNETT,
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION (Princeton University Press 2004) and challenging
Professor Barnett's claim that judicial activism stems from libertarian judicial original-
ism); Archibald Cox, The Role of the Supreme Court: Judicial Activism or Self-Restraint?,
47 MD. L. REV. 118, 118-19 (1987) (arguing that a moderate judicial process between ideo-
logical extremes of activism and restraint would best serve the Constitution); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1401, 1401 (2002) (proclaiming "judicial activism" void of any real meaning in that it
is exclusively used to criticize those in ideological opposition); Earl M. Maltz, The Pros-
pects for a Rival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV.
629, 630-31 (1990) (arguing that both political viewpoints can be validly associated with
judicial activism).
8 For a collection of such assertions from former President Ronald W. Reagan, President
George W. Bush, Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia, and others, see Randy M. Mas-
tro, The Myth of the Litigation Explosion, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 199, 202-03 & n.27 (1999)
(reviewing WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT (Dutton 1991)).
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Because the phrase "judicial activism" means nothing, it can-
not be coherently described, and because it cannot be coherently
described, it cannot be measured empirically. Consequently, this
Article does not attempt to measure it. Nor, for that matter,
have other recent articles that have addressed judicial behavior
truly attempted to measure judicial activism, even as they em-
ploy this phrase. 9 Therefore, what is actually studied in this and
other scholarly articles is judicial deference, not judicial activ-
ism.10 Deference refers to the tendency of judges to defer to the
political branches (i.e., the legislative and the executive). Here,
deference is measured simply by counting how often courts strike
down acts of the legislature. A judge that upholds the action of a
political branch against a constitutional challenge brought by an
individual (or group of individuals) is being deferential; a judge
who strikes down the action of the political branch is being non-
deferential.
Of course, even though the term "judicial activism" is generally
devoid of meaning, there is an obvious connection between what
is referred to as judicial deference and what people ostensibly
mean when they use the phrases "judicial activist" or "judicial ac-
tivism." The connection has to do with judicial legitimacy. When
a critic says that a judge is an activist or that a decision exhibits
judicial activism, what the critic ordinarily means is that the ju-
dicial action is illegitimate-that the judge did something he or
she ought not to have done.1 In the context of constitutional ad-
judication, where a court is declaring an act of the executive or
the legislature (federal, state, or other) unconstitutional, "ille-
gitimate" ordinarily means that the court has wrongly thwarted
9 For a discussion in the context of the Terri Schiavo case, see Edward A. Hartnett, The
Schiavo Case: A Symposium: Congress Clears Its Throat, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 553
(2005).
10 For an earlier effort to measure deference in a more limited context, but using essen-
tially the same approach we have used, see generally Nicholas S. Zeppos, Deference to Po-
litical Decision Makers and the Preferred Scope of Judicial Review, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 296
(1993). Using data compiled by Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner, Pro-
fessor Zeppos studied Supreme Court deference in the period from 1938 to 1992. Id. at
303-04. He did not employ the discrete models of constitutional adjudication that we use,
nor was he interested in examining the voting behavior of individual Justices. Id.
11 See Young, supra note 7. This Article enumerates various categories of judicial activ-
ism. Although elucidating the types of mistakes judges can make is beyond the scope of
this Article, the two most common errors are identifiable: (1) treating as authoritative a
text that ought not to be treated as authoritative, or (2) misreading a text that has been
properly treated as authoritative.
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the will of the majority12-that the court has substituted its will
or judgment for the action of the legislature, the immediate rep-
resentatives of the people. To take perhaps the most famous ex-
ample in constitutional history, when critics argue that the deci-
sions in Roe v. Wade13 and its progeny exemplify judicial
activism, the essence of the criticism is that the Roe line of cases
illegitimately defies the political majority's efforts to place some
restrictions on the right to choose an abortion. Legitimacy is
therefore closely related to the so-called counter-majoritarian dif-
ficulty.14 "Judicial activists" render decisions that are illegitimate
because they wrongfully thwart the will of the majority by impos-
ing their own beliefs on the populace.1 5 Once the connection be-
tween the phrase "judicial activism" (or "activist") and decisions
that thwart the will of the majority is acknowledged, the concept
can then be measured empirically. Even though "judicial activ-
ism" does not describe a discrete methodology, the capacity exists
to tally up the instances where judges overturn acts of the politi-
cal majority, and the results of that calculation produce a body of
data. 16
12 In a series of articles, Barry Friedman has said probably everything there is to say
about this point. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH L.
REV. 577 (1993). "The countermajoritarian difficulty posits that the 'political' branches are
'legitimate' because they further majority will, while courts are illegitimate because they
impede it." Id. at 630. See also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The
History of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002).
Deference to other brands of government is typically the frame for evaluating the
work of constitutional judges, and apparent anxiety over the legitimacy of judicial re-
view has begun to produce increasingly creative (albeit somewhat stretched) descrip-
tions of both democracy and judicial review. Such scholarship commonly assumes,
without argument, that legislative bodies are democratically legitimate, and that
most of what judicial review is aimed at is overturning the decisions of such bodies.
Id. at 165-66. Friedman also notes a book regarding reconciling judicial review with the
workings of democratic government, stating that according to the author, "when the Su-
preme Court invalidates the work of an actor who is subject to the electoral process, the
Court 'exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it."' Id. at 201
(quoting ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 17 (Bobbs-Merrill 1962)).
13 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
14 BICKEL, supra note 12, at 16 (discussing how "the root difficulty is that judicial re-
view is a counter-majoritarian force in our system").
15 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. The types of mistakes judges can make that
lead to an illegitimate outcome are hardly the sole province of so-called judicial activists,
but amplifying that obvious observation is beyond our present scope.
16 See, e.g., Ringhand, supra note 4, at 44. This article states that that examining voting
records of individual justices provides specific, empirical data on how justices used judi-
cial review. See also Cross & Lindquist, supra note 4, at 1701. "A commonly invoked
measure of judicial activism is the Court's willingness to invalidate statutes. While this is
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Notably, however, not every judge who votes to overturn a law
on constitutional grounds earns the appellation "judicial activ-
ist." As the data reveals, for example, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
as well as Justices Scalia and Thomas, voted to overturn many
laws supported by a political majority during the years examined
in this Article, yet one rarely hears them referred to as judicial
activists. Hence, equating "judicial activist" with "a judge who
votes to overrule the majority" is too crude a measure to be use-
ful. The reason is because constitutional adjudication, which is
the context where these phrases arise, is not a singular phe-
nomenon.
In physics, when confronted with an intractable problem, the
best approach might be to make the problem bigger. In law,
however, or at least when addressing intractable problems of
constitutional theory, a more sound approach is to make the
problem smaller. For that reason, judicial deference on the
Rehnquist Court is examined by taking a single problem and di-
viding it into three subsets. In this respect, the analysis con-
tained in this Article departs from recent scholarship. 17 The
analysis begins by describing the shrinking of the problem, and
then by presenting the data.
A. Defining Deference
In the context of this paper, deference is defined as "deference
to the political majority." A deferential judge permits the action
of the majority to stand. A non-deferential judge strikes down
the action of the majority. The will of the political majority
might be either manifested by executive or legislative action, or
exerted directly by the people. It will depend on the context and
which agency of government is acting. At times, the relevant
government will be the federal government; at other times, it will
be a state government or a political subdivision of a state gov-
ernment. However, for purposes of measuring a judge's defer-
ence, it does not matter which agency of the government has
acted; it matters only that some agency of the government has
not a perfect or complete measure of activism, it surely has a rough accuracy, because
striking down legislation is a clear flexing of judicial power at the expense of another
branch of government." Id.
17 The most notable study this analysis departs from is Professor Lori A. Ringhand's
study, where she quantifies judicial activism. Ringhand, supra note 4.
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acted, and that only one government agency has acted, such that
the government action can be presumed to represent the will of
the majority.
At a relatively high level of generality, there is no dispute
about the fundamental soundness of judicial review. Since Mar-
bury v. Madison,i8 and probably even before, 19 judicial review has
been viewed as appropriate. Indeed, in any so-called higher law
system, where "higher law" refers to a body of rules or principles
that are not subject to alteration by a mere majority vote, there
must be some institution that enforces the higher law when it is
perceived to be at variance with a measure enacted by the major-
ity.20 In most higher law regimes, this institution is the judiciary.
The same is true in the United States, which is obviously a
higher-law system. Consequently, the question in contemporary
constitutional theory is not whether judicial power exists to
thwart the will of the majority, but rather when and how it ought
to be exercised.
This examination of the Rehnquist Court reveals that Justices
who trumpet the virtue of deference in one context are heedless
to deference in other contexts. Conversely, other Justices who
dismiss the importance of deference in certain instances embrace
it tightly in others. It is possible that these perturbations are
unprincipled, but it is also possible there is an explanation for
these seeming irregularities or inconsistencies. The data reveals
manifest patterns, enabling one to predict outcomes in particular
cases with a high degree of confidence.
In the study's measurement of judicial deference, three differ-
ent categories of constitutional adjudication were distinguished.
These categories were not invented. Rather, they exist in consti-
tutional law as an epistemic matter. However, although the
categories are not created, this Article departs from other exami-
nations of the Rehnquist Court to suggest, perhaps for the first
time, that these categories are germane to assessing and measur-
ing judicial deference.
18 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
19 See generally William Michael Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 455 (2005) (analyzing judicial review case law in the United States pre-Marbury).
20 See generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-53 (Princeton University
Press 1988).
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All overarching constitutional problems-including problems of
standing, justiciability, jurisdiction, and legitimacy-have sev-
eral iterations. How a given issue should be resolved in one con-
text may not dictate how it should be resolved in another. For
example, whether a party has suffered an injury sufficient to con-
fer standing to raise a First Amendment free speech challenge
may not be measured the same way as when a plaintiff raises a
claim under the liberty clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 21
To date, however, the debate in American jurisprudence, as rep-
resented both in case law as well as academic commentary, has
approached the legitimacy problem as a unitary one. The debate
has assumed that constitutional adjudication is a singular phe-
nomenon.22 Our examination of the Rehnquist Court's jurispru-
dence alters that assumption. Constitutional adjudication is
treated in this Article as three things, not one, and it is shown
that any reliable measure of judicial behavior must be sensitive
to these three distinct iterations. Because of these iterations, it
is possible for a judge to be deferential in one area, and non-
deferential in another. In turn, this truth suggests that an ag-
gregate measure of deference is less illuminating than a more
nuanced examination of deference in discrete contexts.
Problems related to legitimacy can arise in at least three dis-
tinct contexts: rights model adjudication, separation of powers
litigation, and federalism cases. Each is briefly discussed in the
sections that follow.
21 In the First Amendment context, the importance of the chilling effect has the conse-
quence of expanding the meaning of "injury" sufficient to confer standing. Compare
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), which describes standing in view of as-
serted over-breadth and vagueness in First Amendment challenges and NAACP v. But-
ton, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), which highlights standing in view of its chilling effect, with City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), which uses standing to challenge a non-
imminent use of a chokehold and Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992),
which explains standing to enforce federal environmental regulations.
22 This is the case in classic literature, including, for example, BICKEL, supra note 12;
Gerald Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"-A Comment on Principle and
Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (Harvard University Press 1980). It is also
true in contemporary literature; some notable examples include PHILIP BOBBITT,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (Oxford University Press 1982);
LEVINSON, supra note 20; Steven G. Calabresi, Textualism and the Countermajoritarian
Difficulty, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1373 (1998); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation,
71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). There are some prominent exceptions, including, e.g., Rich-
ard H. Fallon, Jr., The "Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Deci-
sions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002).
[Vol. 23:1
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ONREHNQUIST COURT
B. The Rights Model
Rights model adjudication ("RMA") is the most familiar form of
constitutional adjudication. In certain respects, it is the quintes-
sential constitutional adjudication. When citizens imagine the
courts enforcing constitutional law, they typically imagine rights
model adjudication. For example, Roe v. Wade is a rights model
case.
Rights model adjudication takes the form of an individual (or
group of individuals) versus the state. The logical structure of
these cases is always the same: individual versus the state,
which translates into minority versus majority. The state can be
the federal government, a state or local government, or some
combination thereof. In rights model adjudication, the state ex-
ercises some power, either executive or legislative (or, very
rarely, judicial), and an individual (or group of individuals) ar-
gues that the exercise of state power has infringed one or more of
their rights.
So-called legitimacy concerns are at their apogee in the context
of the rights model, precisely because the premise of rights model
adjudication is conflict between the majority and a minority.
That is, the very reason these cases arise is that the majority
acts, either through the executive or the legislature, and the mi-
nority is injured as a result of the majority's action. Further-
more, the minority argues, that it has rights that prevent the
majority from acting as it has. This majority-minority conflict is
present, by definition, in all rights model cases. Examples of this
dynamic are commonplace: the majority prohibits the minority
from voting or registering to vote; 23 the majority criminalizes
sexual conduct engaged in by members of the minority;24 the ma-
jority prevents terminally ill patients from receiving physicians'
23 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 537-40 (1964). Residents, taxpayers and voters
filed a suit challenging the apportionment of the Alabama Legislature. Id. The complaint
alleged their rights were deprived under the Alabama Constitution and under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. See also Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 664-66 (1966). Here Virginia residents brought a suit alleging that
Virginia's poll tax was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.
24 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562-64 (2003) (questioning the validity of a Texas
statute making it a crime for two people of the same sex to engage in certain sexual con-
duct).
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assistance in terminating their lives; 25 the majority bars restau-
rants from selling foie gras.26 In each of these cases, the minority
challenges the majority's action, arguing that it violates their
rights under the Constitution.
When a court sides with an individual in rights model adjudi-
cation (RMA), the court is, by definition, thwarting the will of the
majority. If a judge says that lesbians can marry one another, he
is ruling that the majority's efforts to preclude such unions are
unconstitutional. 27 Similarly, if a judge says children cannot have
organized prayer during high school events, he is nullifying the
majority's efforts to permit such prayer. 28 Rulings like these give
rise to charges that judges who rule for individuals in RMA are
imposing their own values on the polity, or "legislating" from the
bench. Such rulings generate charges of judicial "activism." No
single principle or methodology can describe each of these cases.
What they do have in common, however, is that in all RMA cases,
the judges have overruled actions of the majority; in all of them,
the judges have been non-deferential.
C. Separation of Powers
The second type of constitutional adjudication involves conflict
not between the majority and a minority, but between (or among)
25 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705-08 (1997). The state of Washington
brought an action against a group of doctors for "promoting a suicide attempt." Id. The
question before the Court was whether Washington's "prohibition against 'causing' or 'aid-
ing' a suicide offend[ed] the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution."
Id.
26 See Angry Chefs Cook up Lawsuit Over Foie Gras Ban, MSNBC, Aug. 22, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/14472971/. "Chefs have called the ban an attack on their
right to choose what kinds of dishes they want to create and an attack on the rights of
consumers." Id.
27 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 972 (Mass. 2003) (ruling
in favor of same-sex marriage under the auspice of a Massachusetts Constitution that
serves to limit the state legislature from imposing a "caste-like system" with respect to
such unions); see also Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (concluding, similarly,
that a Vermont law prohibiting same-sex marriages runs afoul of the constitutional guar-
antees and societal interests to which the state legislature must conform, and does not
endorse nor mandate an understanding of marriage as one limited to that between a man
and a woman).
28 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (affirming a purported
violation of the Establishment Clause on the grounds that the "policy is ... on its face ...
an improper majoritarian election on religion, and unquestionably has the purpose and
creates the perception of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important school
events.").
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branches of government. Unlike RMA, separation of powers
("SOP") litigation does not invariably involve a majority-minority
dynamic. This important fact makes deference difficult, if not
impossible, to precisely measure in SOP litigation. Further, the
difficulty of assessing deference in this context explains why
charges of "judicial activism" are rarely heard in the aftermath of
SOP cases, even SOP cases of rather high profile. If legitimacy
concerns are at their most intense in RMA, they are at an ebb in
SOP cases.
The twin concepts of deference and legitimacy have only a
muted application to SOP litigation because SOP cases can arise
in diametrically opposing scenarios. They might arise when two
(or more) branches of the federal government work in unison, or
they might emerge when two (or more) branches of government
are in opposition. In neither context, however, is there an obvi-
ous tension between the majority and the minority. The reason,
of course, is that-in theory-both the Executive and the Con-
gress represent the majority. For at least a generation, this
theoretical assumption-that the political branches in fact repre-
sent majority will-has been known to be false.29 Nevertheless,
the so-called counter-majoritarian difficulty and, indeed, virtu-
ally all problems of constitutional theory, assume that it is true.
In SOP litigation, a minority of the cases do involve a majority-
minority conflict-namely, those where the President and Con-
gress act jointly and have their joint action rebuffed by the judi-
cial branch-but most cases do not. The classic SOP conflict, for
example, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,30 involved a
case where Congress and the President were at loggerheads. 31
Most contemporary SOP disputes likewise manifest conflict
(rather than cooperation) between two or more branches. Con-
gress and the President (or the President and the judiciary) did
not act jointly, for example, when President Truman seized the
29 See generally DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (Yale
University Press 1975) (1974) (arguing that the principal motivation of legislators is re-
election); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (Yale University Press 1989)
(discussing the history and nature of democracy and suggesting how it must change in the
future); see also David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The Case of
Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13-14 & n.52 (1990).
30 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
31 Actually, the Court assumed they were at loggerheads, though this assumption may
well have been infirm, a point beyond our present scope.
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steel mills, 32 when President Nixon invoked a claim of executive
privilege,33 or when President Clinton claimed immunity from
civil suit for actions taken prior to his Presidency. 34 In this com-
mon scenario, where branches of the federal government disagree
with one another, there is no plausible way to conceive of the con-
flict in terms of majority versus minority, because there is no way
to determine which of the two branches more accurately repre-
sents the majority will. For example, when Congress insists that
the War Powers Resolution applies to a certain conflict, while the
President insists that it does not,35 which point of view repre-
sents majority will? There is no coherent theoretical answer to
this question, which in turn implies that neither answer neces-
sarily contradicts the majoritarian viewpoint.
On the other hand, it is true that in a great deal of contempo-
rary SOP litigation, Congress and the President have acted to-
gether. For example, the legislative veto36 and the line-item
veto37 are cases where the two branches have acted jointly. Nev-
ertheless, even in these cases, viewing the dispute in terms of
majority versus minority is complicated to the point of impossi-
bility. Where Congress seeks to exercise a legislative veto, or
where the President seeks to execute a line-item veto, one politi-
cal branch has been authorized by the other to act, but the ac-
tions of the two branches are nevertheless in contrast. As a re-
sult, there is no obvious or apparent way to view the resulting
litigation as a majority versus minority dispute, because one de-
mocratic branch is purporting to overrule the decision of another.
Therefore, because judicial review in SOP cases typically does
not raise legitimacy concerns, this assessment of the Rehnquist
Court does not take SOP cases into account in analyzing the
various Justices' deference to political institutions.
32 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 579.
33 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 686 (1974).
34 Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 686-87 (1997).
35 Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356-57 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S.
1251 (1984). (holding that the issue presented a nonjusticiable political question).
36 Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 924-25, 928 (1983)
(discussing the constitutionality of the legislative veto of the Attorney General's recom-
mendation for suspension of an alien's deportation under Immigration and Nationality
Act).
37 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 421-23 (1998) (challenging the constitu-
tionality of the Line Item Veto Act after the President exercised his authority under the
Act by cancelling one provision in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 and two provisions in
the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997).
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D. Federalism
Finally, the third type of constitutional adjudication involves
questions relating to the allocation of power between state gov-
ernments and the federal government. Whereas in SOP litiga-
tion a small minority of the cases arguably do involve a majority-
minority conflict (namely, those where the President and Con-
gress act jointly, and the judicial branch then overturns that
joint action), in the federalism context, the opposite is the case.
Although a small number of cases arise where the federal gov-
ernment's interest is at odds with that of one or more states,38
most contemporary federalism cases reflect an alignment of fed-
eral and state governments. In other words, most contemporary
federalism cases find the state and federal sovereigns in agree-
ment. This means, of course, that judicial action striking down
these laws implicates the same majority-minority dynamic that
is also present in RMA.
For example, in United States v. Lopez, which struck down a
federal law that prohibited gun possession within 1,000 feet of a
school, the party challenging the federal legislation was not a
state government that believed that the federal government had
intruded on its sovereignty, but rather an individual. 39 The state
governments supported the federal legislation. Similarly, in
United States v. Morrison, which struck down a federal law that
provided a private right of action to women who were victims of
sexual assault, the party challenging the statute was not a state
(or group of states), but was instead an individual. 40 Again, the
state governments supported the federal law. Although these are
federalism cases, in the sense that the doctrinal basis of the deci-
sions has to do with the constitutionally prescribed allocation of
power between the state and federal governments, they involve
the majority-minority dynamic for precisely the same reason that
the RIA cases do: because the majority's understanding of the
38 E.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (challenging provisions of Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243 (2006) (upholding Oregon law permitting doctors to prescribe medicine to terminally
ill patients which would permit those patients to terminate their lives); Gonzales v. Raich,
545 U.S. 1 (2005) (ratifying congressional power to prohibit medical marijuana use, and
thereby overrule state law that permits or authorizes such use).
39 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
40 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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constitutional principles, as reflected in its action, is overruled by
the judicial branch.
Whereas most SOP disputes cannot be evaluated in terms of
majority versus minority, and therefore cannot be re-
characterized into RMA terms, most federalism cases do involve
the overruling of the majority, and therefore can be re-
conceptualized in RMA terms. Occasionally, the interests of
state and federal sovereigns are in tension with one another, and
under such circumstances, federalism cases, like most SOP dis-
putes, cannot be recast in RMA terms. However, because the in-
terests of state and federal governments are typically aligned in
modern federalism cases, a judicial decision that strikes down
the legislative enactment favors the minority over the majority.
This raises precisely the same legitimacy concerns present in the
typical RMA case. 41 Therefore, federalism cases are included in
this assessment of the Rehnquist Court's deference to political
institutions.
II. MEASURING DEFERENCE AND PREDICTING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Approximately 170 cases were examined between 1995 and
2005, i.e., from the October 1994 Term through the end of the Oc-
tober 2004 Term, which was the last full term of the Rehnquist
Court. Cases are analyzed based on two principal criteria: the
perceived importance of the case, and the vote in the case. Gen-
erally, cases were not examined if they were not widely regarded
as both significant and non-unanimous.42
41 Of course there are exceptions. When the state (or group of states) challenges the fed-
eral government's action, it is impossible to re-characterize these cases as majority versus
minority disputes because there are two "majorities" involved: the state majority and the
federal majority. In a future article, we argue that this category of federalism cases
should be deemed nonjusticiable on the grounds that there is an adequate political solu-
tion.
42 In Appendix 2, an alphabetical listing of each of the cases contained in this analysis
is provided. Our selection of cases coincides largely with the cases identified by Linda
Greenhouse of The New York Times as the Term's most important cases. However,
Greenhouse's analysis regularly examines a number of statutory cases, whereas our focus
is exclusively on constitutional cases. See Linda Greenhouse, Roberts Is at Court's Helm,
but He Isn't Yet in Control, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2006, at 11; Linda Greenhouse, The 2004-
2005 Session: Court's Term a Turn Back to the Center, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2005, at Al;
Linda Greenhouse, The Year Rehnquist May Have Lost His Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2004, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court: Overview; In a Momentous Term,
Justices Remake the Law, and the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2003, at Al; Linda Green-
house, Court Had Rehnquist Initials Intricately Carved on Docket, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
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Nearly ninety percent of the cases in the data-set are rights
model cases, and just over ten percent are federalism cases. The
rights model cases, however, cover a very broad range, encom-
passing criminal procedural rights, Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights, First Amendment free speech rights, First
Amendment religion rights, Eighth Amendment issues, habeas
corpus questions, and jurisdictional as well as justiciability is-
sues. Because the RMA cases cover such broad terrain, viewing
these cases as a whole can be misleading. For example, a Justice
who might be highly deferential in cases raising due process chal-
lenges to government action, for instance Justice Scalia, who
earns a perfect deference score of 100 percent in this category,
might be far less deferential in other seemingly related contexts,
for example Justice Scalia's deference score of zero in free exer-
cise cases. Accordingly, although aggregate data is presented for
RMA cases below, issue-by-issue voting tallies for these cases are
also presented, and the model used to predict judicial behavior
disaggregates the RMA cases.
The Rehnquist Court is commonly stated to have had its most
significant impact in reshaping federalism doctrine. The data
bears out this assessment. Chief Justice Rehnquist himself was
non-deferential in forty-seven percent of the federalism cases. In
this context, "non-deferential" means that the Justice voted
against a measure enacted by Congress (and, in nearly all the
cases, also supported by the states). The highest figure for non-
deference, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, was Justice Kennedy,
with a non-deference score of seventy-four percent. Justices
Scalia and Thomas were non-deferential sixty-three percent of
2002, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, In Year of Florida Vote, Supreme Court Also Did Much
Other Work, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2001, at A12; Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Split Deci-
sions; The Court Rules, America Changes, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2000, at 41; Linda Green-
house, The Nation: Supreme Court; The Justices Decide Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMES,
June 27, 1999, at 41; Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Weaves Legal Principles From a
Tangle of Litigation, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1998, at A20; Linda Greenhouse, Benchmarks
of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 1997, at Al; Linda Greenhouse, Legacy of a Term-A Spe-
cial Report; In Supreme Court's Decisions, A Clear Voice, and a Murmur, N.Y. TIMES, July
3, 1996, at 1; Linda Greenhouse, The Nation: Gavel Rousers; Farewell to the Old Order in
the Court, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1995, at 1. This statutory/constitutional distinction is re-
sponsible for the majority of the discrepancies between our data-set and the cases identi-
fied by Greenhouse. Hence, of the 169 cases we examine, only fifty-five are not included in
Greenhouse's analysis. Of those fifty-five, twenty-four are habeas corpus cases; another
seven raise Eleventh Amendment issues.
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the time. At the other end of the spectrum, Justice Ginsburg was
deferential in the federalism cases seventy-four percent of the
time. Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer were deferential
sixty-three percent of the time.
In the federalism context, therefore, the Justices who were the
least deferential to the political majority were Justices Kennedy,
Scalia, and Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. The Justices
who were most likely to defer to the political branches were Jus-
tices Ginsburg, Stevens, Souter, and Breyer.
In RMA, the numbers are predictably different. In First
Amendment cases that presented free speech issues, Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor were the most deferential,
with deference scores of sixty-five percent. Justices Kennedy and
Souter were least deferential, with a deference score of twenty
percent, and Justice Stevens was nearly the same, with a defer-
ence score of twenty-five percent. Similarly, in First Amendment
cases raising establishment clause concerns, Chief Justice
Rehnquist was deferential eighty percent of the time, followed by
Justice Scalia at seventy-eight percent and Justice Thomas at
seventy percent. Justice Souter, on the contrary, was deferential
only twenty percent of the time, followed by Justices Stevens,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, who each had deference scores of thirty
percent.
Overall, in rights model cases, the line-up of the Court as a
whole is nearly the mirror image on deference scores as it is in
the federalism cases. The following chart summarizes the data
presented in greater detail in the following section.
Overview of total deference scores:
Deference (non- Deference (non-
Justice deference) percent deference) percent
in RMA / rank in federalism / rank
Rehnquist 71 (29) / 2 53 (47) / 5
Stevens 25 (75) / 9 63 (37) / 2 (t)*
O'Connor 55 (45) / 4 42 (58) / 6
Scalia 72 (28) / 1 37 (63) / 7 (t)
Kennedy 49 (51)/5 26 (74)/9
Souter 28 (72) / 8 63 (37) / 2 (t)
Thomas 68 (32) / 3 37 (63) / 7 (t)
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Ginsburg 3 (67)/7 I74 (26) /1
Breyer 38 (62) / 6 63 (37) / 2 (t)
*(t) tied for that particular ranking
The data confirms what has been intuitively assumed by a
number of commentators: that the issue of deference is not two-
dimensional, but instead, a judge's deference score depends inti-
mately on the type of case being adjudicated. For example, Jus-
tice Ginsburg ranks first in deference in the federalism cases but
seventh in the rights model cases; Justice Scalia, on the other
hand, ranks first in deference in the rights model cases but sev-
enth in the federalism cases. Thus, the same Justices who are
most deferential in the rights model context-and who most vo-
cally complain that the non-deferential Justices are illegitimately
interfering with the will of the political majority43-are among
the least deferential to the political majority in the federalism
context. Conversely, the same Justices who are most willing to
defer to the political majority in the federalism cases are among
those least willing to do so in the rights model cases.
The statistical analysis presented below reveals something fur-
ther: that there is a nuance even within the rights model cases-
that is, a given Justice's deference score varies from one type of
RMA case to the next. There is no apparent methodological justi-
fication for this variation. Therefore, it tends to suggest that a
given Justice's deference in RMA cases reflects that Justice's as-
sessment of the comparative importance of the individual right
asserted, versus the apparent state interest in abridging it.
43 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602-03 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"[Tihe Court has taken sides in the culture war, departing from its role ... as neutral ob-
server .... So imbued is the Court with the law profession's anti-anti-homosexual cul-
ture, that it is seemingly unaware that the attitudes of that culture are not obviously
,mainstream."' Id. See also Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing). "Seldom has an opinion of this Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the per-
sonal views of its members." Id.
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III. DEFERENCE TABLES FOR INDIVIDUAL ISSUES
Issue: 1 1th Amendment (4 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 50.0% 50.0%
Ginsburg 25.0% 75.0%
Kennedy 75.0% 25.0%
O'Connor 75.0% 25.0%
Rehnquist 75.0% 25.0%
Scalia 75.0% 25.0%
Souter 50.0% 50.0%
Stevens 25.0% 75.0%
Thomas 50.0% 50.0%
Issue: 1 4 th Amendment - Due Process (14 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 21.4% 78.6%
Ginsburg 42.9% 57.1%
Kennedy 57.1% 42.9%
O'Connor 42.9% 57.1%
Rehnquist 78.6% 21.4%
Scalia 100% 0.0%
Souter 21.4% 78.6%
Stevens 21.4% 78.6%
Thomas 92.9% 7.1%
Issue: 14th Amendment - Equal Protection/Privileges &
Immunities (16 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 43.8% 56.3%
Ginsburg 50.0% 50.0%
Kennedy 25.0% 75.0%
O'Connor 37.5% 62.5%
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Rehnquist * 40.0% 60.0%
Scalia 43.8% 56.3%
Souter 50.0% 50.0%
Stevens 43.8% 56.3%
Thomas ** 53.5% 46.7%
* Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in Johnson v.
California - No. 03-363.
** Justice Thomas did not participate in United States v. Vir-
ginia.
Issue: 1 5th Amendment - Voting (1 case)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 0.0% 100%
Ginsburg 100% 0.0%
Kennedy 0.0% 100%
O'Connor 0.0% 100%
Rehnquist 0.0% 100%
Scalia 0.0% 100%
Souter 0.0% 100%
Stevens 100% 0.0%
Thomas 0.0% 100%
Issue: 1st Amendment - Establishment Clause (10 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 30.0% 70.0%
Ginsburg 30.0% 70.0%
Kennedy 60.0% 40.0%
O'Connor 40.0% 60.0%
Rehnquist 80.0% 20.0%
Scalia * 77.8% 22.2%
Souter 20.0% 80.0%
Stevens 30.0% 70.0%
Thomas 70.0% 30.0%
* Justice Scalia did not participate in Elk Grove v. Newdow.
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Issue: 1s' Amendment - Free Association (5 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 60.0% 40.0%
Ginsburg 40.0% 60.0%
Kennedy 40.0% 60.0%
O'Connor 40.0% 60.0%
Rehnquist 40.0% 60.0%
Scalia 40.0% 60.0%
Souter 40.0% 60.0%
Stevens 40.0% 60.0%
Thomas 40.0% 60.0%
Issue: 1st Amendment - Free Exercise (3 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 66.7% 33.3%
Ginsburg 33.3% 66.7%
Kennedy 33.3% 66.7%
O'Connor 66.7% 33.3%
Rehnquist 66.7% 33.3%
Scalia 0.0% 100%
Souter 66.7% 33.3%
Stevens 33.3% 66.7%
Thomas 0.0% 100%
Issue: 1st Amendment - Free Speech (20 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 60.0% 40.0%
Ginsburg 35.0% 65.0%
Kennedy 20.0% 80.0%
O'Connor 65.0% 35.0%
Rehnquist 65.0% 35.0%
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Scalia 55.0% 45.0%
Souter 20.0% 80.0%
Stevens 25.0% 75.0%
Thomas 35.0% 65.0%
Issue: 4 th Amendment - Search & Seizure (12 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 58.3% 41.7%
Ginsburg 33.3% 66.7%
Kennedy 91.7% 8.3%
O'Connor 66.7% 33.3%
Rehnquist 100% 0.0%
Scalia 91.7% 8.3%
Souter 33.3% 66.7%
Stevens 16.7% 83.3%
Thomas 91.7% 8.3%
Issue: 5th Amendment - Double Jeopardy/Due Proc-
ess/Self-Incrimination (7 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 42.9% 57.1%
Ginsburg 28.6% 71.4%
Kennedy 57.1% 42.9%
O'Connor 85.7% 14.3%
Rehnquist 71.4% 28.6%
Scalia 85.7% 14.3%
Souter 28.6% 71.4%
Stevens 0.0% 100%
Thomas 71.4% 28.6%
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Issue: 5th Amendment - Takings Clause (2 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 100% 0.0%
Ginsburg 100% 0.0%
Kennedy 100% 0.0%
O'Connor 50.0% 50.0%
Rehnquist 0.0% 100%
Scalia 0.0% 100%
Souter 100% 0.0%
Stevens 100% 0.0%
Thomas 0.0% 100%
Issue: 6th Amendment - Jury Trial (3 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 66.7% 33.3%
Ginsburg 0.0% 100%
Kennedy 66.7% 33.3%
O'Connor 100% 0.0%
Rehnquist 100% 0.0%
Scalia 100% 0.0%
Souter 100% 0.0%
Stevens 100% 0.0%
Thomas 100% 0.0%
Issue: 8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual Punishment (8
cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 0.0% 100%
Ginsburg 0.0% 100%
Kennedy 25.0% 75.0%
O'Connor 37.5% 62.5%
Rehnquist 75.0% 25.0%
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Scalia 87.5% 12.5%
Souter 0.0% 100%
Stevens 0.0% 100%
Thomas 87.5% 12.5%
Issue: Habeas Corpus (41 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 22.0% 78.0%
Ginsburg 19.5% 80.5%
Kennedy 56.1% 43.9%
O'Connor 58.5% 41.5%
Rehnquist * 77.5% 22.5%
Scalia 87.8% 12.2%
Souter 17.1% 82.9%
Stevens 19.5% 80.5%
Thomas 90.2% 9.8%
* Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in Brown v.
Payton.
Issue: Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ (6 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 33.3% 66.7%
Ginsburg 83.3% 16.7%
Kennedy 50.0% 50.0%
O'Connor 33.3% 66.79
Rehnquist 83.3% 16.7%
Scalia 83.3% 16.7%
Souter 66.7% 33.3%
Stevens 50.0% 50.0%
Thomas 66.7% 33.3%
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Issue: Federalism (18 cases)
Justice % - Deferential % - Non-
Deferential
Breyer 63.0% 37.0%
Ginsburg 74.0% 26.0%
Kennedy 26.0% 74.0%
O'Connor 42.0% 58.0%
Rehnquist 53.0% 47.0%
Scalia 37.0% 63.0%
Souter 63.0% 37.0%
Stevens 63.0% 37.0%
Thomas 37.0% 63.0%
IV. DEFERENCE TABLES FOR INDIVIDUAL JUSTICES
Justice Breyer
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 50.0% 50.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 21.4% 78.6%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 43.8% 56.3%
15th Amendment - Voting 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 30.0% 70.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 60.0% 40.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 66.7% 33.3%
1st Amendment - Free Speech 60.0% 40.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 58.3% 41.7%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 42.9% 57.1%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 100% 0.0%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 66.7% 33.3%
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8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 0.0% 100%
Habeas Corpus 22.0% 78.0%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 33.3% 66.7%
Federalism Cases 63.0% 37.0%
Justice Ginsburg
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 25.0% 75.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 42.9% 57.1%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 50.0% 50.0%
15th Amendment - Voting 100% 0.0%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 30.0% 70.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 33.3% 66.7%
1st Amendment - Free Speech 35.0% 65.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 33.3% 66.7%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 28.6% 71.4%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 100% 0.0%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 0.0% 100%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 0.0% 100%
Habeas Corpus 19.5% 80.5%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 83.8% 16.7%
Federalism Cases 74.0% 26.0%
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Justice Kennedy
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 75.0% 25.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 57.1% 42.9%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 25.0% 75.0%
15th Amendment - Voting 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 60.0% 40.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 33.3% 66.7%
1st Amendment - Free Speech 20.0% 80.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 91.7% 8.3%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 57.1% 42.9%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 100% 0.0%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 66.7% 33.3%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 25.0% 75.0%
Habeas Corpus 56.1% 43.9%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 50.0% 50.0%
Federalism Cases 26.0% 74.0%
Justice O'Connor
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 75.0% 25.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 42.9% 57.1%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 37.5% 62.5%
15th Amendment - Voting 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 46.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 66.7% 33.3%
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1st Amendment - Free Speech 65.0% 35.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 66.7% 33.3%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 85.7% 14.3%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 50.0% 50.0%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 100% 0.0%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 37.5% 62.5%
Habeas Corpus 58.5% 41.5%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 33.3% 66.7%
Federalism Cases 42.0% 58.0%
Chief Justice Rehnquist
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 75.0% 25.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 78.6% 21.4%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities 40.0% 60.0%
15th Amendment - Voting 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 80.0% 20.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 66.7% 33.3%
1st Amendment - Free Speech 65.0% 35.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 100% 0.0%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 71.4% 28.6%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 0.0% 100%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 100% 0.0%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 75.0% 25.0%
Habeas Corpus 77.5% 22.5%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 83.3% 16.7%
Federalism Cases 53.0% 47.0%
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Justice Scalia
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 75.0% 25.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 100% 0.0%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 43.8% 56.3%
15th Amendment - Voting 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 77.8% 22.2%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Free Speech 55.0% 45.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 91.7% 8.3%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 85.7% 14.3%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 0.0% 100%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 100% 0.0%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 87.5% 12.5%
Habeas Corpus 87.8% 12.2%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 83.3% 16.7%
Federalism Cases 37.0% 63.0%
Justice Souter
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 50.0% 50.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 21.4% 78.6%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 50.0% 50.0%
15th Amendment - Voting 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 20.0% 80.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 66.7% 33.3%
[Vol. 23:1
JUDICIALACTIVISMONREHNQUISTCOURT
1st Amendment - Free Speech 20.0% 80.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 33.3% 66.7%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 28.6% 71.4%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 100% 0.0%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 100% 0.0%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 0.0% 100%
Habeas Corpus 17.1% 82.9%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 66.7% 33.3%
Federalism Cases 63.0% 37.0%
Justice Stevens
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 25.0% 75.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 21.4% 78.6%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 43.8% 56.3%
15th Amendment - Voting 100% 0.0%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 30.0% 70.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 33.3% 66.7%
1st Amendment - Free Speech 25.0% 75.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 16.7% 83.3%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 0.0% 100%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 100% 0.0%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 100% 0.0%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 0.0% 100%
Habeas Corpus 19.5% 80.5%
Standing ! Jurisdiction / Writ 50.0% 50.0%
Federalism Cases 63.0% 37.0%
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Justice Thomas
% - Def- % - Non-
Issue Description erential Deferential
11th Amendment 50.0% 50.0%
14th Amendment - Due Process 92.9% 7.1%
14th Amendment - Equal Protec-
tion/Privileges & Immunities. 53.3% 46.7%
15th Amendment - Voting 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause 70.0% 30.0%
1st Amendment - Free Association 40.0% 60.0%
1st Amendment - Free Exercise 0.0% 100%
1st Amendment - Free Speech 35.0% 65.0%
4th Amendment - Search & Seizure 91.7% 8.3%
5th Amendment - Double Jeop-
ardy/Due Process/Self-Incrimination 71.4% 28.6%
5th Amendment - Takings Clause 0.0% 100%
6th Amendment - Jury Trial 100% 0.0%
8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment 87.5% 12.5%
Habeas Corpus 90.2% 9.8%
Standing / Jurisdiction / Writ 66.7% 33.3%
Federalism Cases 37.0% 63.0%
V. PREDICTING JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR
Although an individual who challenges a state's ban on private
consensual homosexual activity44 is instigating a rights model
case just as an individual who challenges a state's display of a
model of the Ten Commandments, 45 the language of the opinions
addressing these and similar concerns can reveal greater or
lesser affinity for the individual rights asserted in the respective
suits. Put differently, one limitation of treating the rights model
44 E.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558 (litigating a dispute between a private individual and
the state's ban on homosexual activity).
45 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (challenging Texas' Ten Com-
mandments display); McCreary County v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 545 U.S. 844 (2005)
(litigating a challenge to Kentucky's Ten Commandments display).
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cases as a single entity is that individual Justices do not neces-
sarily regard all individual rights as of equal importance. As a
result, subcategories were created in the rights model cases to
predict judicial behavior.
Table M provides the results of this analysis. The rights model
cases were subdivided into five categories. Category A includes
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment cases, First Amendment
freedom of speech and association cases, and First Amendment
establishment cases. Category B includes First Amendment free
exercise cases. Category C includes Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eighth Amendment cases, as well as habeas corpus cases. Cate-
gory D includes federalism cases. Category E includes standing,
jurisdiction, and related justiciability cases.
Based upon the weighted probabilities of each Justices' votes,
Table M presents the number of cases assigned to each category
and the number of cases correctly predicted. Obviously, the
probability matrix was developed after the Rehnquist Court
ended, and it employs a limited number of cases. Nevertheless,
the model demonstrates a high degree of reliability in predicting
the outcome of cases in the aggregate. In every category except
B, where the number of cases was far too low to measure any
meaningful predictive pattern, the model predicts actual out-
comes in more than eighty-five percent of cases in the aggre-
gate.46
46 It is less likely that such a high level of "correct" predictions would take place at the
individual case level. Though initial indications show a solid correlation, the high degree
of variance would preclude the possibility of such a strong showing. That said, the model
does predict significantly above 50% of the cases in nearly every category (every category
where the numbers are sufficient to provide a sufficient number of instances).
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Table M:
Prediction of Outcomes based upon Individual Justice
Probability
Num- Predic- Number Percent Cor-
Category ber of tion of Pre- rectly deter-
cases deference dicted/Act mined by
ual Model
Category 71 45% 32/38 92%**
A
Category 3 33% 1/2 50%
B
Category 73 52% 38/41 95%**
C
Category 19 50% 10/8 89%*
D
Category 8 61% 5/6 87%*
E I II
Total 169 49% 83/97 91%**
** Correlation
test).
is significant at the .01/.05 level (two tailed
* Correlation is significant at the .10 level (two tailed test).
In addition to generating a model that can predict outcomes,
the data collected permits a measurement of individual deference
scores for Justices in each of the constructed categories, and
thereby allows for a measurement of each Justice's deviation
from the mean. Table N reports the results of this analysis.
Each Justices' individual voting is measured, by category,
against a hypothetical "perfect" mean. The mean is constructed
by being insensitive to the precise issue before the Court. Thus,
for example, the mean score in Category A is exactly thirty-five
because there are seventy cases. The actual voting pattern of
each Justice is then measured for the significance of its depar-
ture from that mean. This departure should be highest, and
most significant, at the theoretical poles. The significance, and
the departure from the mean, should disappear for judges whose
behavior is centrist-assuming that the cases arriving at the
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Court are, themselves, not biased in one direction or another.47 In
each category, the departure from the perfect mean increases as
a Justice's voting behavior shows a predilection toward non-
deference.
Table N:
Prediction of Outcomes based upon Individual Justice
Probability
Category Category Category Category Category
Justice A B C D E
70 3 73 19 6
Souter -9** +.5 -15** +2.3 n  +1
Stevens -7** - -18** +2.3 n  -
Kennedy -3* - +7* -4.3* -
Ginsberg -2 - -17** +4.3* +2n
Breyer - +.5 -10"* +2.3n -1
O'Conner +4* +.5 +12** -.4* -1
Thomas +10** -.5 +30** -2.3n +1
Rehnquist +14** +.5 +25** -.5 +2n
Scalia +15** -.5 +30** -2.3 n  +2n
** Correlation is significant at the .01 level (two tailed test).
* Correlation is significant at the .05 (two tailed test).
"n" Correlation is significant at the .05 level (one tailed test, or
.10 for a two tailed test).
- No predictive power was found in either direction.
CONCLUSION
Legitimacy and deference are not complementary ideals. A
Court that is more deferential is not necessarily a Court with
greater legitimacy. The issue is more nuanced. A legitimate
Court is a Court that is deferential in circumstances where def-
erence is appropriate, and non-deferential in circumstances
where deference is inappropriate.
47 This assumption is important. If, for example, a large bias one way or the other exists
amongst the lower courts (for example, lower courts are disproportionately likely to be
deferential) then the correction at the high Court could be exaggerated.
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What do the data from the Rehnquist Court reveal about le-
gitimacy? As shown, the Justices are differentially deferential,
depending on the substantive issue presented in the case. In-
deed, it is possible to predict with a great degree of accuracy how
those Justices are likely to vote simply by knowing the issue in-
volved in the case. To translate these deference results into le-
gitimacy scores, however, requires a theory that describes when,
as a general matter, deference is required.
Although there is no single solution to the so-called counter-
majoritarian difficulty, there may be several different solutions,
where the answer to how the Justices ought to behave depends
on the nature of the issue before them.
In both the rights model and separation-of-powers model, there
is a theoretical justification for judicial review. Thus, in RMA,
judicial review serves the same essential function that it serves
in all higher-law legal systems: protecting the minority against
majoritarian enactments that run afoul of principles with which
the majority is not permitted to alter.48 In the SOP cases, the jus-
tification is somewhat more difficult, but not impossible to con-
struct. Although there is not necessarily a majority-minority dy-
namic in these cases, judicial intervention is predicated on the
fiction that the system of checks-and-balances is so precisely at-
tuned, that permitting it to become even the slightest bit out of
true will lead to tyranny. The theory is a version of the ancient
Chinese proverb that a journey of a thousand miles begins with
the first step. For example, a slight, nearly imperceptible shift of
power from the legislative to the executive branch will not itself
cause tyranny, but it will lead to a second shift, which will in
turn lead to a third, and so on and so on, such that eventually,
there will (or may) be tyranny. This basic argument began with
Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown 49-a forma-
tive SOP case-and continued through Justice Stevens' opinion
48 Dow, supra note 29, at 14-29 (discussing the principle of majoritarianism); David R.
Dow & Jose I. Maldonado, Jr., How Many Spouses Does the Constitution Allow One to
Have?, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 571, 585 n.55 (2003-2004) (reviewing SARAH BARRINGER
GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION: POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA (UNC Press 2002) and stating that majoritarian politics
cannot change religious law).
49 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., con-
curring).
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in Clinton v. New York, 50 perhaps the most recent prominent
SOP dispute.
The notion that even the slightest change of the delicate bal-
ance of powers will lead to further shifts, which in turn will lead
to the threat of tyranny, has a bit of a chicken-little feel to it, and
may be entirely wrong as a predictive or theoretical matter. 51
Yet, insofar as the claim is sound, the harm associated with dis-
turbing the SOP scheme (i.e., tyranny) is similar to, and perhaps
even identical to, the harm associated with violations of individ-
ual rights that are the hallmark of the rights model. In both the
rights model and separation of powers cases, therefore, judicial
review serves one principal goal: safeguarding liberty from the
threat of tyranny. Where the political branches intrude directly
on individual rights, or where they seek to alter the balance of
power among the federal branches in such a way as to make such
an intrusion more probable, the role of the courts is to intervene,
to say no to the majority, and thereby to preserve our rights and
freedoms.
No such argument is available in the federalism cases. On the
contrary, Justice Blackmun suggested more than twenty years
ago that there was yet no justification for judicial review in fed-
eralism cases, and his assertion has yet to be answered. 52 The
closest attempt at providing a theoretical basis for non-deference
in these cases occurred in Justice O'Connor's opinion in New
York v. United States.53 Justice O'Connor argued that, just as the
horizontal allocation of power among the three federal branches
prevents any branch from accumulating so much power as to
50 524 U.S. 417, 430-31 (1998) (recognizing the "importance of respecting the constitu-
tional limits on [the court's] jurisdiction, even when Congress has manifested an interest
in obtaining (the court's] views as promptly as possible," the court nevertheless deter-
mined that the challenge to the Constitutionality of the particular Act involved was justi-
ciable since the President had exercised his authority, and appellees alleged an injury as
a result of that action).
51 See id. at 478 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Act in question did not
grant the executive too much power; Congress merely created a law that delegated power
to nullify statutory language).
52 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985) (Powel, J., dis-
senting) (stating that due to the Court's decision, the role of States in the federal system
now depends upon federal officials, rather than on the Constitution as interpreted by the
Court).
53 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992) (concluding that "while Congress has substantial power un-
der the Constitution to encourage States to provide for the disposal of the radioactive
waste generated within their borders, the Constitution does not confer upon Congress the
ability simply to compel the States to do so.").
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pose a threat to liberty, the vertical distribution of power be-
tween the federal government, on the one hand, and the state
governments, on the other, serves the identical function. 54 But
Justice O'Connor's claim has always been vulnerable to three ob-
servations. First, if the underlying idea in the SOP cases is that
perfect horizontal equilibrium among the three federal branches
is the key to avoiding tyranny, then the vertical distribution of
power should be irrelevant, except in those cases where it tips
the horizontal balance. However, it is hard to see how a shift of
power from the states to the federal government, or vice versa,
could ever alter the horizontal federal balance, except for those
cases where Congress is ceding some of its own power to the
states. Nonetheless, this is certainly not what occurs in the SOP
cases that raised the interest of the Rehnquist Court. Second,
Justice Blackmun observed in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropoli-
tan Transit Authority that the states are fully capable of protect-
ing their sovereign interests simply by virtue of the fact that
members of Congress are also citizens of their respective states, 55
and no one has yet provided a satisfactory answer to that obser-
vation. Finally, although Justice O'Connor is surely correct
when she says that voters must know whom to blame when the
government enacts an unpopular measure, 56 it is hard to see how
this truth justifies non-deference in the federalism cases. This is
an era when most voters do not know whom to blame because
they do not know who their representatives are. 57 Resting any
54 See id. at 181-82 (noting the separation of powers among federal branches of govern-
ments and the distribution of power between federal and state governments serve the
same function).
55 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-51 (describing the Framer's Constitutional design to pro-
tect the states from overreaching by Congress).
56 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 168-69 (explaining that when the Federal
Government compels the state to act, the accountability of both state and federal officials
is diminished; state officials may suffer public, and voter disapproval despite federal offi-
cials having designed the regulatory program); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 576-78 (1995) ("The theory that two governments accord more liberty than one re-
quires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political accountability: one
between the citizens and the Federal Government; the second between the citizens and
the States.").
-1 See Stephen Ansolabehere & Phil Jones, Constituents' Policy Perceptions and Ap-
proval of their Members of Congress (2005), http://web.mit.edu/polisci/portl1material
papers/ansolabeherejones.pdf. Data is listed from 2005 that reveals only about one-half
of all Americans can name their representative in the U.S. Congress. Id. at 16-18. Of
those who can name their representative, many do not know how their representative
voted on many salient issues. Id. See also Press Release, Most Americans Can't Name
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constitutional argument on the people's familiarity with their
elected officials is precarious.
What is left, therefore, is this: Justice Stevens and Justice
Scalia were the poles of the Rehnquist Court, and may yet prove
to be the poles of the Roberts Court. The difference between
them is not that one is more deferential than the other, or more
activist, or more distant from the mean. The difference is that
Justice Stevens is non-deferential in cases where non-deference
is theoretically sound, while Justice Scalia votes to thwart the
majority in cases where the majoritarian view ought to rule.
Any Supreme Court Justices, Says FindLaw.com Survey (Jan. 10, 2006),
http://company.findlaw.com/pr/2006/01l1006.supremes.html. The national survey results
are listed. Id.; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 181. The fundamental purpose of
protecting individuals is served by the structure of the government. Id. New York v.
United States is one of the very few contemporary federalism cases where the interests of
the federal and state governments have not in fact been aligned. Id. For that reason, and
that reason alone, the finding that New York's grievance presented a justiciable issue is
sound, even if the more general language relating to federalism cases as a whole is not.
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APPENDIX 1: ALPHABETICAL CASE LIST, WITH VOTES BY JUSTICE
Case Name Issue / Deferential Non-
Model Justice(s) Deferential
Justice(s)
44 Liquor- 1st Amend- n/a Breyer, Gins-
mart Inc. v. ment - Free burg, Ken-
Rhode Is- Speech (R) nedy,
land O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Agostini v. 1st Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Felton ment - Estab- O'Connor, burg, Souter,
lishment Rehnquist, Stevens
Clause (R) Scalia, Thomas
Alden v. 1 1th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Maine ment (F) burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
Arkansas 1st Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
Educ. Tele- ment - Free nedy, Souter, Ste-
vision Speech (R) O'Connor, vens
Comm'n v. Rehnquist,
Forbes Scalia, Thomas
Ashcroft v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Stevens
ACLU (De- ment - Free burg, Kennedy,
cided May Speech (R) O'Connor,
18, 2002) Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Ashcroft v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Ginsburg,
ACLU (De- ment - Free O'Connor, Kennedy,
cided June Speech (R) Rehnquist, Souter, Ste-
29, 2004) Scalia vens, Thomas
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Ashcroft v. 1st Amend- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
Free Speech ment - Free Rehnquist, burg, Ken-
Coalition Speech (R) Scalia nedy, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Atkins v. 8th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Virginia ment - Cruel Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
& Unusual nedy,
Punishment O'Connor,
(R) Souter, Ste-
vens
Atwater v. 4th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
City of Lago ment - Search Rehnquist, burg,
Vista & Seizure (R) Scalia, Souter, O'Connor, Ste-
Thomas vens
Banks v. Habeas Cor- Scalia, Thomas Breyer, Gins-
Dretke pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Beard v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Banks t pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Bell v. Cone Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- Stevens
t pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,O'Connor
, Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Bennis v. 14th Amend- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ken-
Michigan ment - Due O'Connor, nedy, Souter,
Process (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
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Blakely v. 6th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
Washington ment - Jury nedy, Scalia, Souter,
Trial (R) O'Connor, Stevens, Tho-
Rehnquist mas
BMW of 14th Amend- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ken-
North Amer- ment - Due Rehnquist, nedy,
ica, Inc. v. Process (R) Scalia, Thomas O'Connor,
Gore Souter, Ste-
vens
Board of 4th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
Education v. ment - Search nedy, O'Connor,
Earls & Seizure (R) Rehnquist, Souter, Ste-
Scalia, Thomas vens
Board of 1st Amend- na Breyer, Gins-
Regents v. ment - Free burg, Ken-
Southworth Association nedy,
(R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Board of 1 1th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Trustees v. ment / 14th - burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Garrett Equal Protec- Stevens Rehnquist,
tion (F) Scalia, Tho-
mas
Bogan v. 1 th Amend- Breyer, Gins- n/a
Scott-Harris ment (R) burg, Kennedy,
tO'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Boy Scouts 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
of America ment - Free burg, Souter, O'Connor,
v. Dale Association Stevens Rehnquist,
(R) Scalia, Tho-
mas
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Bracy v. Habeas Cor- n/a Breyer, Gins-
Gramley t pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Bradshaw v. Habeas Cor- n/a Breyer, Gins-
Stumpf t pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Brosseau v. 4th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Stevens
Hagen t ment - Search burg, Kennedy,
& Seizure (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Brown v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
Payton t * pus (R) nedy, Souter, Ste-
O'Connor, vens
Scalia, Thomas
Buckley v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Ginsburg,
ACLF ment - Free O'Connor, Kennedy,
Speech (R) Rehnquist Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Bunting v. 1st Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Mellen t ment - Estab- Scalia burg, Ken-
lishment nedy,
Clause (R) O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens, Thomas
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Bush v. Gore 14th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
ment - Equal O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Protection (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Bush v. Vera 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
ment - Equal burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Protection (R) Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
Calderon v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Thompson t pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Camps New- 1/8 - Com- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ken-
found v. merce Clause Rehnquist, nedy,
Town of - Dormant (F) Scalia, Thomas O'Connor,
Harrison Souter, Ste-
vens
Capitol 1st Amend- Ginsburg, Ste- Breyer, Ken-
Square Rev. ment - Estab- vens nedy,
& Advisory lishment O'Connor,
Bd. v. Clause (R) Rehnquist,
Pinette Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Carlisle v. 5th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy, Ste-
United ment - Due burg, vens
States t Process (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
City of 1st Amend- Breyer, Ginsburg,
Boerne v. ment - Free O'Connor, Kennedy,
Flores Exercise (R) Souter Rehnquist,
Scalia, Ste-
vens, Thomas
[Vol. 23:1
JUDICIALACTIVISMONREHNQ U1STCOURT
City of Chi- 14th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
cago v. ment - Due Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
Morales t Process (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Clay v. Habeas Cor- n/a Breyer, Gins-
United pus (R) burg, Ken-
States t nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Clingman v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg, Ste-
Beaver t ment - Free nedy, vens, Souter
Association O'Connor,
(R) Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
Clinton v. 1/7 - Present- Breyer, Ginsburg,
City of New ment Clause O'Connor, Kennedy,
York (F) Scalia Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens, Thomas
Colo. Repub. 1st Amend- Ginsburg, Ste- Breyer, Ken-
Fed. Cam- ment - Free vens nedy,
paign Speech (R) O'Connor,
Comm'n v. Rehnquist,
FECt Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Cook v. 1/4 - Elections n/a Breyer, Gins-
Gralike t Clause (F) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
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County of 4th Amend- Breyer, Gins- n/a
Sacramento ment - Search burg, Kennedy,
v. Lewis & Seizure (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Denmore v. 5th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Hyung Joon ment - Due O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Kim Process (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Denver Area 1st Amend- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
Educ. Tele- ment - Free Rehnquist, burg, Ken-
com. Con, Speech (R) Scalia, Thomas nedy, Souter,
Inc. v. FCC Stevens
Dept. of 111/2 - Stand- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Commerce v. ing / Statu- burg, Souter, O'Connor,
U.S. House tory - Census Stevens Rehnquist
of Rep. Act (F) Scalia, Tho-
mas
Dodd v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
United pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
States t Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Dretke v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Haley t pus (R) burg, Souter, Ste-
O'Connor, vens
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
Duncan v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Walker t pus (R) O'Connor, burg
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
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Early v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- n/a
Packer t pus (R) burg, Kennedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Edwards v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- n/a
Carpenter t pus (R) burg, Kennedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Elk Grove v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- n/a
Newdow ** ment - Estab- burg, Kennedy,
lishment O'Connor,
Clause (R) Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens, Thomas
Ewing v. 8th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
California ment - Cruel O'Connor, burg, Souter,
& Unusual Rehnquist, Stevens
Punishment Scalia, Thomas
(R)
F.E.C. v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Colorado ment - Free burg, Rehnquist,
Republican Association O'Connor, Scalia, Tho-
(R) Souter, Ste- mas
vens
Federal Re- Jurisdiction - Ginsburg, Breyer, Ste-
public of Bill of Com- Kennedy, vens
Germany v. plaint (in a O'Connor,
United criminal case) Rehnquist,
States t (R) Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
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Felker v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- n/a
Turpin pus (R) burg, Kennedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Ferguson v. 4th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
City of ment - Search Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
Charleston & Seizure (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Florida Bar 1st Amend- Breyer, Ginsburg,
v. Went-For- ment - Free O'Connor, Kennedy,
It, Inc. Speech (R) Rehnquist, Souter, Ste-
Scalia, Thomas vens
Georgia v. 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Ashcroft ment - Equal burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Protection (R) Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
Gonzales v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- Souter, Ste-
Crosby t pus (R) burg, Kennedy, vens
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
Good News 1st Amend- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ken-
Club v. Mil- ment - Estab- Souter, Ste- nedy,
ford Central lishment vens O'Connor,
School Clause (R) Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
Granholm v. 1/8 - Com- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
Heald t merce Clause Rehnquist, burg, Ken-
(F) Stevens, Tho- nedy, Scalia,
mas Souter
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Gratz v. 14th Amend- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ken-
Bollinger ment - Equal Souter nedy,
Protection (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Ste-
vens, Thomas
Gray v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Netherland pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
t Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Grutter v. 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Bollinger ment - Equal burg, Rehnquist,
Protection (R) O'Connor, Scalia, Tho-
Souter, Ste- mas
vens
Hamdi v. Habeas Cor- Scalia, Ste- Breyer, Gins-
Rumsfeld pus (R) vens, Thomas burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter
Harris v. 5th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
United ment - Due nedy, Souter, Ste-
States Process (R) O'Connor, vens, Thomas
Rehnquist,
Scalia
Hiibel v. 4th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Sixth Judi- ment - Search O'Connor, burg, Souter,
cial District & Seizure (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Court Scalia, Thomas
Hohn v. Habeas Cor- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
United pus (R) Rehnquist, burg, Ken-
States t Scalia, Thomas nedy, Souter,
Stevens
Hope v. Pel- 8th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
zer ment - Cruel Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
& Unusual nedy,
Punishment O'Connor,
(R) Souter, Stevens
2008]
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Hurley v. 1st Amend- n/a Breyer, Gins-
Irish- ment - Free burg, Ken-
American Speech (R) nedy,
Gay Gp. of O'Connor,
Boston Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
LN.S. v. St. Habeas Cor- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
Cyr pus (R) Rehnquist, burg, Ken-
Scalia, Thomas nedy, Souter,
Stevens
Idaho v. 1 1th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Coeur ment (F) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
d'Alene Rehnquist, Stevens
Tribe t Scalia, Thomas
Illinois v. 4th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Wardlow ment - Search O'Connor, burg, Souter,
& Seizure (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Johnson v. 14th Amend- Scalia, Thomas Breyer, Gins-
California - ment - Equal burg, Ken-
No. 03-363 * Protection (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Johnson v. 14th Amend- Thomas Breyer, Gins-
California - ment - Equal burg, Ken-
No. 04-6964 Protection (R) nedy,
t O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens
Jones v. 6th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
United ment - Jury nedy, Scalia, Souter,
States Trial (R) O'Connor, Stevens, Tho-
Rehnquist mas
[Vol. 23:1
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Kansas v. 14th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Hendricks ment - Due O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Process (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Kelo v. City 5th Amend- Breyer, Gins- O'Connor,
of New Lon- ment - Tak- burg, Kennedy, Rehnquist,
don ings Clause Souter, Ste- Scalia, Tho-
(R) vens mas
Khanh Jurisdiction - Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Phong Art. IV burg, O'Connor,
Nguyen v. Judges Rehnquist, Souter, Ste-
United (Criminal Scalia vens, Thomas
States Case) (R)
Kimel v. 11th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Florida Bd. ment (F) burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Of Regents Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
Kiowa Tribe 11th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg, Ste-
of Okla- ment (R) nedy, vens, Thomas
homa v. Mfg. O'Connor,
Tech. Inc. t Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter
Kyllo v. 4th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
United ment - Search O'Connor, burg, Scalia,
States & Seizure (R) Rehnquist, Souter, Tho-
Stevens mas
Lawrence v. 14th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Texas ment - Due Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
Process (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Lindh v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Murphy pus (R) Rehnquist, burg,
Scalia, Thomas O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
2008]
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Locke v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Scalia, Tho-
Davey ment - Free burg, Kennedy, mas
Exercise (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Lockyer v. 8th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Andrade ment - Cruel O'Connor, burg, Souter,
& Unusual Rehnquist, Stevens
Punishment Scalia, Thomas
(R)
Lorillard 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Tobacco v. ment - Free burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Reilly Speech (R) Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
McCreary v. 1st Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
ACLU ment - Estab- Rehnquist, burg,O'Connor
lishment Scalia, Thomas , Souter, Ste-
Clause (R) vens
McIntyre v. 1st Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Ohio Elec- ment - Free Scalia, burg, Ken-
tions Com'n Speech (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens, Thomas
McKune v. 5th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Lile ment - Self O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Incrimination Rehnquist, Stevens
(R) Scalia, Thomas
McMillan v. 1 1th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Monroe ment (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
County t Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Miller v. 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Johnson ment - Equal burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Protection (R) Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
[Vol. 23:1
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Miller-El v. Habeas Cor- Thomas Breyer, Gins-
Cockrell pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens
Miller-El v. Habeas Cor- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Dredke pus (R) Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Missouri v. 14th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Jenkins ment - Equal O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Protection (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Mitchell v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
Helms ment - Estab- nedy, Souter, Ste-
lishment O'Connor, vens
Clause (R) Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
Montana v. 14th Amend- Ginsburg, Breyer,
Egelhoff t ment - Due Kennedy, O'Connor,
Process (R) Rehnquist, Souter, Ste-
Scalia, Thomas vens
Morse v. Re- 1st Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
pub. Party ment - Free Rehnquist, burg,
of Virginia t Association Scalia, Thomas O'Connor,
(R) Souter, Ste-
vens
Nat'l Park 111/2 - Ripe- Ginsburg, Breyer,
Hospitality ness (R) Kennedy, O'Connor
Ass'n v. Rehnquist,
Dep't of In- Scalia, Souter,
terior t Stevens, Tho-
mas
2008]
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NEA v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Souter
Finley ment - Free burg, Kennedy,
Speech (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Ste-
vens, Thomas
Neder v. 5th Amend- n/a Breyer, Gins-
United ment - Due burg, Ken-
States t Process (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Nelson v. 8th Amend- n/a Breyer, Gins-
Campbell t ment - Cruel burg, Ken-
& Unusual nedy,
Punishment O'Connor,
(R) Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Nevada 1 1th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Dep't of ment (F) burg, Scalia, Tho-
Human Re- O'Connor, mas
sources v. Rehnquist,
Hibbs Souter, Ste-
vens
Nike, Inc. v. Writ Improvi- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ken-
Kasky dently Rehnquist, nedy,
Granted (R) Scalia, Souter, O'Connor
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Nixon v. 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Shrink Mo. ment - Free burg, Scalia, Tho-
Gov't Speech (R) O'Connor, mas
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
_vens
[Vol. 23:1
JUDICIAL ACTIVISMONREHNQUISTCOURT
O'Dell v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Netherland pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Ohio For- 111/2 - Stand- Breyer, Gins- n/a
estry Ass'n v. ing (R) burg, Kennedy,
Sierra Club O'Connor,
t Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Oklahoma 1/8 - Com- Ginsburg, Breyer,
Tax Com'n merce Clause Kennedy, O'Connor
v. Jefferson (F) Rehnquist,
Lines, Inc. f Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
O'NeaI v. Habeas Cor- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
McAninch pus (R) Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
O'Sullivan Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
v. Boerckel t pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Stevens
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Pace v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
DiGuglielmo pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
t Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Penry v. 8th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Johnson ment - Cruel Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
& Unusual nedy,
Punishment O'Connor,
(R) Souter, Ste-
vens
2008]
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Raines v. 111/2 - Stand- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ste-
Byrd ing (F) Kennedy, vens
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Ramdass v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Angelone t pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Rasul v. Habeas Cor- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Bush pus (R) Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Reno v. 1st Amend- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
American ment - Free Rehnquist burg, Ken-
Civil Liber- Speech (R) nedy, Scalia,
ties Union Souter, Ste-
vens, Thomas
Republican 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Party of ment - Free burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Minnesota v. Speech (R) Stevens Rehnquist,
White Scalia, Tho-
mas
Rice v. 15th Amend- Ginsburg, Ste- Breyer, Ken-
Cayetano ment - Voting vens nedy,
(R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Ring v. Ari- 6th Amend- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
zona ment - Jury Rehnquist burg, Ken-
Trial (R) nedy, Scalia,
Souter, Ste-
vens, Thomas
[Vol. 23:1
JUDICIALACTIVISMONREHNQUISTCOURT
Romer v. 14th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Evans ment - Equal Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
Protection (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Rompilla v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Beard pus (R) Rehnquist, burg,
Scalia, Thomas O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Roper v. 8th Amend- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
Simmons ment - Cruel Rehnquist, burg, Ken-
& Unusual Scalia, Thomas nedy, Souter,
Punishment Stevens
(R)
Rumsfeld v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Padilla pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Saenz v. Roe 14th Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
ment - Privi- Thomas burg, Ken-
leges & Im- nedy,
munities O'Connor,
Clause (R) Scalia, Souter,
Stevens
Sandin v. 14th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Conner ment - Due O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Process (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Santa Fe 1st Amend- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
I.S.D. v. Doe ment - Estab- Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
lishment nedy,
Clause (R) O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
2008]
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Schriro v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Summerlin pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Seminole 1 1h Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Tribe of Fla. ment (F) burg, Souter, O'Connor,
v. Fla. Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
Shafer v. 14th Amend- Scalia, Thomas Breyer, Gins-
South Caro- ment - Due burg, Ken-
lina t Process (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Shaw v. 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Hunt ment - Equal burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Protection (R) Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
Slack v. Habeas Cor- Scalia, Thomas Breyer, Gins-
McDaniel t pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Smith v. 8th Amend- Scalia, Thomas Breyer, Gins-
Texas t ment- Cruel burg, Ken-
& Unusual nedy,O'Connor
Punishment Rehnquist,
(R) Souter, Ste-
vens
State Farm 14th Amend- Ginsburg, Breyer, Ken-
v. Campbell ment - Due Scalia, Thomas nedy,O'Connor
Process (R) Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
[Vol. 23:1
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Stenberg v. 14th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gin.3-
Carhart ment - Due Rehnquist, burg,
Process (R) Scalia, Thomas O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Strickler v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Greene t pus (R) burg, Souter
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Ste-
vens, Thomas
Swidler & 5th Amend- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
Berlin v. ment - Self- Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
United Incrimination nedy,
States (R) Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Swint v. Jurisdiction - n/a Breyer, Gins-
Chambers Pendent Party burg, Ken-
County / 11th Amend- nedy,
Com'n t ment (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Tahoe- 5th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Rehnquist,
Sierra Pre- ment - Tak- burg, Kennedy, Scalia, Tho-
serv. v. Ta- ings Clause O'Connor, mas
hoe Re- (R) Souter, Ste-
gional vens
Tenet v. Poe 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- n/a
t ment - Due burg, Kennedy,
Process (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
2008]
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Tennessee lth Amend- Breyer, Gins- Scalia, Tho-
Student As- ment (F) burg, Kennedy, mas
sistance O'Connor,
Corp. v. Rehnquist,
Hood t Souter, Ste-
vens
Tennard v. Habeas Cor- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Dretke t pus (R) Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Tennessee v. 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
Lane ment - Equal burg, Rehnquist,
Protection (R) O'Connor, Scalia, Tho-
Souter, Ste- mas
vens
Town of 14th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg, Ste-
Castle Rock ment - Due nedy, vens
v. Gonzales Process (R) O'Connor,
t Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Troxel v. 14th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Granville ment - Due Scalia, Stevens burg,
Process (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Tho-
mas
Tyler v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Cain t pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
U.S. Term 10th Amend- O'Connor, Breyer, Gins-
Limits, Inc. ment - Term Rehnquist, burg, Ken-
v. Thornton Limits (F) Scalia, Thomas nedy, Souter,
Stevens
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United 1st Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
States v. ment - Free nedy, Souter, Ste-
American Speech (R) O'Connor, vens
Library Rehnquist,
Ass'n Scalia, Thomas
United 4th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
States v. ment - Search nedy, Souter, Ste-
Drayton & Seizure (R) O'Connor, vens
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
United 1/8 - Com- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
States v. Lo- merce Clause burg, Souter, O'Connor,
pez (F) Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
United 1/8 - Com- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
States v. merce Clause burg, Souter, O'Connor,
Morrison (F) Stevens Rehnquist,
Scalia, Tho-
mas
United 1st Amend- Breyer, Ginsburg,
States v. ment - Free O'Connor, Kennedy,
Playboy En- Speech (R) Rehnquist, Souter, Ste-
tertainment Scalia vens, Thomas
United 1st Amend- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
States v. ment - Free burg, O'Connor Rehnquist,
United Speech (R) Scalia, Souter,
Foods, Inc. Stevens, Tho-
mas
United 5th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Stevens
States v. ment - Double burg, Kennedy,
Ursery Jeopardy (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
2008]
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United 14th Amend- Scalia Breyer, Gins-
States v. ment - Equal burg, Ken-
Virginia * Protection (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Utah v. Ev- 1/2 - Enu- Breyer, Gins- Kennedy,
ans meration burg, O'Connor,
Clause (F) Rehnquist, Scalia, Tho-
Souter, Ste- mas
vens
Vacco v. 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- na
Quill ment - Equal burg, Kennedy,
Protection (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Van Orden 1st Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
v. Perry ment - Estab- nedy, O'Connor,
lishment Rehnquist, Souter, Ste-
Clause (R) Scalia, Thomas vens
Vieth v. 14th Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Jubelirer ment - Equal O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Protection (R) Rehnquist, Stevens
Scalia, Thomas
Vermont 111/2 - Stand- Breyer, Gins- Souter, Ste-
Agency of ing (F) burg, Kennedy, vens
Nat'l Res. v. O'Connor,
United Rehnquist,
States Scalia, Thomas
Vernonia 4th Amend- Breyer, Gins- O'Connor,
School Dist. ment - Search burg, Kennedy, Souter, Ste-
v. Acton & Seizure (R) Rehnquist, vens
Scalia, Thomas
[Vol. 23:1
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Virginia v. 1st Amend- Scalia, Thomas Breyer, Gins-
Black ment - Free burg, Ken-
Speech (R) nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Washington 14th Amend- Breyer, Gins- n/a
v. Glucks- ment - Due burg, Kennedy,
berg Process (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Watchtower 1st Amend- Rehnquist Breyer, Gins-
Bible v. Vii- ment - Free burg, Ken-
lage of Exercise (R) nedy,
Stratton O'Connor,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Wiggins v. Habeas Cor- Scalia, Thomas Breyer, Gins-
Smith pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Williams v. Habeas Cor- n/a Breyer, Gins-
Taylor pus (R) burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
2008]
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Williams v. Habeas Cor- Rehnquist, Breyer, Gins-
Taylor pus (R) Scalia, Thomas burg, Ken-
nedy,
O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Wilson v. 4th Amend- Breyer, Gins- Stevens
Layne ment - Search burg, Kennedy,
& Seizure (R) O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Thomas
Wisconsin 1 1th Amend- n/a Breyer, Gins-
Dept. of Cor- ment (R) burg, Ken-
rections v. nedy,
Schacht t O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Woodford v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Garceau t pus (R) O'Connor, burg, Souter
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Ste-
vens, Thomas
Woodford v. Habeas Cor- Breyer, Gins- n/a
Visciotti t pus (R) burg, Kennedy,
O'Connor,
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Souter,
Stevens, Tho-
mas
Wyoming v. 4th Amend- Breyer, Ken- Ginsburg,
Houghton ment - Search nedy, Souter, Ste-
& Seizure (R) O'Connor, vens
Rehnquist,
Scalia, Thomas
[Vol. 23:1
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON REHNQUIST COURT
Zadvydas v. Habeas Cor- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Davis pus (R) Rehnquist, burg,
Scalia, Thomas O'Connor,
Souter, Ste-
vens
Zelman v. 1st Amend- Kennedy, Breyer, Gins-
Simmons- ment - Estab- O'Connor, burg, Souter,
Harris lishment Rehnquist, Stevens
Clause (R) Scalia, Thomas
t Case is not included in the Linda Greenhouse New York
Times article(s)
* Chief Justice Rehnquist did not participate in Brown v.
Payton or Johnson v. California - No. 03-363.
** Justice Scalia did not participate in Elk Grove v. Newdow.
*** Justice Thomas did not participate in United States v. Vir-
ginia.
2008]
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APPENDIX 2: GREENHOUSE DATA-SET VIS-A-VIS CASES EVALUATED
FOR THIS ANALYSIS
Cases in the Linda Greenhouse Article(s) not included in the
Deference Article (Categories of cases indicated are as listed in
the Greenhouse article(s))
Abrams v. Johnson (1997) - Civil Rights
Adarand Constructors v. Pena (1995) - Discrimination A Stricter
Standard For Affirmative Action
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila (2004) - Federalism & Regulation
Alabama v. Shelton (2002) - Executions, Sex Offenders, Buses
Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. Environ
mental Protection Agency (2004) - Federalism & Regulation
Albertsons Inc. v. Kirkingburg - In Disability Cases, A Narrower
Definition
Alexander v. Sandoval (2001) - Civil Rights
Amchem Products v. Windsor (1997) - Liability
American Airlines v. Wolens (1995) - Business, Taxes FrequentFlier Contract Gets Cleared for Takeoff
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi (2003) - Federal
Authority
Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) - Criminal Law
Arizona v. Evans (1995) - Criminal Law Freeing Public Schools
to Test for Drug Use
Arthur Andersen v. United States (2005) - Business
AT&T Corporation v. Iowa Utilities Board (1999) - In Business -
Consumer Cases Rulings for Both Sides
Babbitt v. Sweet Home (1995) - Federal Powers Revoking Gun-
Free Zones and Term Limits
Bailey v. United States (1996) - Criminal Law Several Victories
for the Government
Baker v. General Motors (1998) - State Courts
Barnett Bank v. Nelson (1996) - Business, Banking Savings and
Loans Could Get Billions
Bartnicki v. Vopper (2001) - Speech & Press
Bates v. Dow AgroSciences LLC (2005) - Federalism
Bennett v. Spears (1997) - Environment
Board of County Commissioners v. Umbehr (1996) - Speech Poli-
tics, Ads and Indecency
[Vol. 23:1
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Bond v. United States (2000) - Criminal Law
Bragdon v. Abbott (1998) - Discrimination
Brogan v. United States (1998) - Criminal Law
Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington (2003) - Property
Rights
Brown v. Pro Football Inc. (1996) - Workplace Pension Issues
and Labor Law
Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth (1998) - Sexual Harass-
ment
Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board (2001) - The
Presidential Election
California Democratic Party v. Jones (2000) - First Amendment:
Association
Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) - Criminal Law & Sentencing
Cedar Rapids v. Garrett (1999) - In Disability Cases, A Narrower
Definition
Chandler v. Miller (1997) - Criminal Law
Cheney v. United States District Court (2004) - Jurisdiction
Chevron USA v. Echazabal (2002) - Workers & Bosses
Chicago v. Morales (1999) - On Criminal Law Issues, Some Rein-
ing In of Authority
Circuit City Stores v. Adams (2001) - Labor
City of Erie v. Pap's AM (2000) - First Amendment: Free Speech
Clark v. Martinez (2005) - Immigration
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems (1999) - In Disability
Cases, A Narrower Definition
Clinton v. Jones (1997) - Presidential Power
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid (1999) - States Get Pro-
tection From an Array of Lawsuits
Connecticut v. Doe (2003) - Criminal Law
Crawford-El v. Britton (1998) - Discrimination
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council (2000) - Federalism
Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005) - Religion
Davis v. Monroe County (1999) - For the Harassed and the Poor,
A Strengthening of Rights
Deck v. Missouri (2005) - Criminal Law & Sentencing
Desert Palace v. Costa (2003) - Equality
Dickerson v. United States (2000) - Criminal Law
Dura Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Broudo (2005) - Business
Easley v. Cromartie (2001) - Civil Rights
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Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel (1998) - Property
Eldred v. Ashcroft (2003) - Business
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House
(2002) - Workers & Bosses
F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. (2004) - Jurisdiction
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton (1998) - Sexual Harassment
FDA v. Brown & Williamson (2000) - Federal Law & Regulation
Federal Communications Commission v. NextWave Personal
Communications Inc. (2003) - Business
Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont (2003) - Free Speech
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority
(2002) - Property, Patients, Patents
Festo Corp. v. SMC Corp. (2002) - Property, Patients, Patents
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank (1999) - States Get Pro-
tection From an Array of Lawsuits
Florida v. J.L. (2000) - Criminal Law
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw (2000) - Federal Law & Regula-
tion
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District (1998) - Sexual
Harassment
General Dynamics Land Systems v. Cline (2004) - Discrimina-
tion
Glickman v. Wileman Bros. (1997) - Free Speech
Gonzaga University v. Doe (2002) - School & After School
Gonzales v. Raich (2005) - Federalism
Granholm v. Heald (2005) - Federalism
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States
(1999) - Casinos and Voter Initiatives Win on Free Speech
Grounds
Hill v. Colorado (2000) - Abortion
Hunt v. Cromartie (1999) - For the Harassed and the Poor, A
Strengthening of Rights
Illinois v. Caballes (2005) - Criminal Law & Sentencing
Illinois v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc. (2003) - Free Speech
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Aguirre (1999) - Im-
migration Cases Mean More Authority for Government
Indianapolis v. Edmund (2001) - Criminal Law
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education (2005) - Discrimina-
tion
Jaffee v. Redmond (1996) - Criminal Law Several Victories for
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the Government
Jama v. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (2005) - Immi-
gration
Kansas v. Crane (2002) - Executions, Sex Offenders, Buses
Kentucky Association of Health Plans v. Miller (2003) - Business
Knowles v. Iowa (1999) - On Criminal Law Issues, Some Reining
In of Authority
Kolstad v. American Dental Association (1999) - For the Har-
assed and the Poor, A Strengthening of Rights
Koon v. United States (1996) - Criminal Law Several Victories
for the Government
Kumho Tire v. Carmichael (1999) - In Business - Consumer
Cases Rulings for Both Sides
Kyles v. Whitley (1995) - Criminal Law Freeing Public Schools to
Test for Drug Use
Legal Services Corporation v. Velazquez (2001) - Speech & Press
Leocal v. Ashcroft (2005) - Immigration
Lewis v. United States (1996) - Criminal Law Several Victories
for the Government
Lingle v. Chevron USA Inc. (2005) - Property Rights
Lockheed v. Spink (1996) - Workplace Pension Issues and Labor
Law
M.L.B. v. S.L.J. (1997) - Due Process
Maryland v. Wilson (1997) - Criminal Law
Matsushita v. Epstein (1996) - Business, Banking Savings and
Loans Could Get Billions
McConnell v. Federal Election Commission (2004) - Politics
McKennon v. Nashville Banner (1995) - Discrimination A
Stricter Standard For Affirmative Action
Medtronic v. Lohr (1996) - Speech Politics, Ads and Indecency
Metro-Goldyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster Ltd. (2005) - Business
Metro-North v. Buckley (1997) - Liability
Mickens v. Taylor (2002) - Executions, Sex Offenders, Buses
Miller v. Albright (1998) - Discrimination
Miller v. French (2000) - Federal Law & Regulation
Minnesota v. Carter (1999) - On Criminal Law Issues, Some
Reining In of Authority
Missouri v. Seibert (2004) - Criminal Law
Mosley v. V Secret Catalogue Inc. (2003) - Business
Murphy v. United Parcel Service (1999) - In Disability Cases, A
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Narrower Definition
National Archives v. Favish (2004) - Privacy
National Cable & Telecommunications Association v. Brand X
Internet Services (2005) - Business
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank &
Trust Co. (1998) - Business
National Labor Relations Board v. Town and Country Electric
(1996) - Workplace Pension Issues and Labor Law
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan (2002) - Workers
& Bosses
Nationsbank of North America v. Variable Annuity Life Insur-
ance Co. (1995) - Business, Taxes Frequent Flier Contract
Gets Cleared for Takeoff
New Jersey v. New York (1998) - Boundaries
New York Times v. Tasini (2001) - Speech & Press
Nguyen v. Immigrations and Naturalization Service (2001) -
Immigration
Norfolk v. Western Railway Co. v. Ayers (2003) - Business
O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers (1996) - Discrimination
A Wide Range of Bias Cases
O'Hare Truck Service v. City of Northlake (1996) - Speech Poli-
tics, Ads and Indecency
Ohio v. Robinette (1997) - Criminal Law
Olmstead v. L.C. (1999)
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services (1998) - Sexual Harass-
ment
Oritz v. Fireboard Corp. (1999) - In Business - Consumer Cases
Rulings for Both Sides
Overton v. Bazzetta (2003) - Criminal Law
Owasso Independent School District v. Falvo (2002) - School &
After School
Palazzo v. Rhode Island (2001) - Property Rights
Pegram v. Herdrich (2000) - Federal Law & Regulation
Pennsylvania Board of Probation v. Scott (1998) - Criminal Law
Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders (2004) - Discrimination
Pennsylvania v. Yeskey (1998) - Discrimination
PGA Tour v Martin (2001) - Civil Rights
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Walsh (2003) - Business
Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation (1998) - Property
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Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm (1995) - Federal Powers Revoking
Gun-Free Zones and Term Limits
Printz v. United States (1997) - Constitutional Structure
Qualitex v. Jacobson Products (1995) - Business, Taxes Frequent
Flier Contract Gets Cleared for Takeoff
Quality King Distrubtors v. L'Anza Research International
(1998) - Business
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products (2000)
Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (1999) -
Immi gration Cases Mean More Authority for Government
Reno v. Bossier Parish (2000) - Civil Rights
Reno v. Condon (2000) - Federalism
Republic of Austria v. Altmann (2004) - Jurisdiction
Richards v. Wisconsin (1997) - Criminal Law
Richardson v. McKnight (1997) - Liability
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995) - Religion Separa-
tion of Church, State and Message
Rousey v. Jacoway (2005) - Business
Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran (2002) - Property, Patients,
Patents
Scheidler v. National Organization for Women (2003) - Criminal
Law
Schlup v. Delo (1995) - Criminal Law Freeing Public Schools to
Test for Drug Use
Schneck v. Pro-Choice Network (1997) - Free Speech
Sell v. United States (2003) - Criminal Law
Smiley v. Citicorp (1996) - Business, Banking Savings and Loans
Could Get Billions
Smith v. City of Jackson (2005) - Discrimination
Smith v. Doe (2003) - Criminal Law
Solid Waste Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
(2001) - Federal Authority
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain (2004) - Jurisdiction
Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. (2005) - Discrimination
State Oil v. Khan (1998) - Business
Stogner v. California (2003) - Criminal Law
Sutton v. United Air Lines (1999) - In Disability Cases, A Nar-
rower Definition
Thompson v. Western States Medical Center (2002) - Judges, the
Web, the Front Door
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Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party (1997) - Free Speech
Toyota Motor Manufacturing Inc. v. Williams (2002) - Workers &
Bosses
Turner Broadcasting v. Federal Communications Commission
(1997) - Free Speech
United States v. Alaska (1997) - Environment
United States v. Armstrong (1996) - Criminal Law Several Victo-
ries for the Government
United States v. Bajakajian (1998) - Criminal Law
United States v. Balsys (1998) - Criminal Law
United States v. Bean (2003) - Criminal Law
United States v. Bestfoods (1998) - Business
United States v. Booker (2005) - Criminal Law & Sentencing
United States v. Hubbell (2000) - Criminal Law
United States v. Locke (2000) - Federalism
United States v. National Treasury Employees Union (1995) -
Speech No Raining on Somebody's Private Parade
United States v. O'Hagan (1997) - Securities Law
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Cooperative (2001) -
Federal Authority
United States v. Patane (2004) - Criminal Law
United States v. Scheffer (1998) - Criminal Law
United States v. Sun-diamond (1999) - On Criminal Law Issues,
Some Reining In of Authority
United States v. Winstar (1996) - Business, Banking Savings
and Loans Could Get Billions
United States v. X-Citment Video (1995) - Criminal Law Freeing
Public Schools to Test for Drug Use
US Airways v. Barnett (2002) - Workers & Bosses
Varity Corporation v. Howe (1996) - Workplace Pension Issues
and Labor Law
Verizon Communications Inc. v. Federal Communications Com-
mission (2002) - Property, Patients, Patents
Virginia v. Hicks (2003) - Free Speech
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations (2001) - Federal
Authority
Whren v. United States (1996) - Criminal Law Several Victories
for the Government
Wilson v. Arkansas (1995) - Criminal Law Freeing Public
Schools to Test for Drug Use
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Wisconsin v. New York (1996) - Speech Politics, Ads and Inde-
cency
Witte v. United States (1995) - Criminal Law Freeing Public
Schools to Test for Drug Use
Cases in the Deference Article not included in the Linda
Greenhouse Article(s)
Beard v. Banks (2004) - Habeas Corpus
Bell v. Cone (2002) - Habeas Corpus
Bogan v. Scott-Harris (1998) - 11th Amendment
Bracy v. Gramley (1997) - Habeas Corpus
Bradshaw v. Stumpf (2005) - Habeas Corpus
Brousseau v. Hagen (2005) - 4 th Amendment - Search & Seizure
Brown v. Payton (2005) - Habeas Corpus
Bunting v. Mellen (2004) - 1st Amendment - Establishment
Clause
Calderon v. Thompson (1998) - Habeas Corpus
Carlisle v. United States (1996) - 5th Amendment - Due Process
City of Chicago v. Morales (1999) - 1 4 th Amendment - Due Proc-
ess
Clay v. United States (2003) - Habeas Corpus
Clingman v. Beaver (2005) - 1st Amendment - Free Association
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Commission v. Federal
Election Commission (1996) - 1st Amendment - Free Speech
Cook v. Gralike (2001) - 1/4 - Elections Clause
Dodd v. United States (2005) - Habeas Corpus
Dretke v. Haley (2004) - Habeas Corpus
Duncan v. Walker (2001) - Habeas Corpus
Early v. Packer (2003) - Habeas Corpus
Edwards v. Carpenter (2000) - Habeas Corpus
Federal Republic of Germany v. United States (1999) - Jurisdic-
tion - Bill of Complaint (in a criminal case)
Gonzales v. Grosby (2005) - Habeas Corpus
Granholm v. Heald (2005) - I/8 - Commerce Clause
Gray v. Netherland (1996) - Habeas Corpus
Hohn v. United States (1998) - Habeas Corpus
Hope v. Pelzer (2002) - 8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual Pun-
ishment
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe (1997) - 11th Amendment
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Johnson v. California - No. 04-6964 (2005) - 1 4 th Amendment -
Equal Protection
Khanh Phong Nguyen v. United States (2003) - Jurisdiction -
Art. IV Judges (Criminal Case)
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Tech. Inc. (1998) -
1 1 th Amendment
McMillan v. Monroe County (1997) - 11 th Amendment
Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) - 1 4th Amendment - Due Process
Morse v. Republican Party of Virginia (1996) - 1st Amendment -
Free Association
National Park Hospitality Association v. Department of Interior
(2003) - 111/2 - Ripeness
Neder v. United States (1999) - 5 th Amendment - Due Process
Nelson v. Campbell (2004) - 8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual
Punishment
O'Sullivan v. Boercekel (1999) - Habeas Corpus
Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club (1998) - 111/2 - Standing
Oklahoma Tax Commission v. Jefferson Lines, Inc. (1995) - 1/8 -
Commerce Clause
Pace v. DiGuglielmo (2005) - Habeas Corpus
Ramdass v. Angelone (2000) - Habeas Corpus
Shafer v. South Carolina (2001) - 14th Amendment - Due Process
Slack v. McDaniel (2000) - Habeas Corpus
Smith v. Texas (2004) - 8th Amendment - Cruel & Unusual Pun-
ishment
Strickler v. Greene (1999) - Habeas Corpus
Swint v. Chambers County Commission (1995) - Jurisdiction -
Pendent Party/ 11th Amendment
Tenet v. Poe (1995) - 14th Amendment - Due Process
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood (2004) - 1 1 th
Amendment
Tennard v. Dretke (2004) - Habeas Corpus
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales (2005) - 1 4 th Amendment - Due
Process
Tyler v. Cain (2001) - Habeas Corpus
Utah v. Evans (2002) - 1/2 - Enumeration Clause
Wisconsin Department of Corrections v. Schacht (1998) - I1th
Amendment
Woodford v. Garceau (2003) - Habeas Corpus
Woodford v. Visciotti (2002) - Habeas Corpus
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Cases in both the Linda Greenhouse Article(s) and the Deference
Article
44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island (1996)
Agostini v. Felton (1997)
Alden v. Maine (1999)
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes (1998)
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2002)
Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union (2004)
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition (2002)
Atkins v. Virginia (2002)
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista (2001)
Banks v. Dretke (2004)
Bennis v. Michigan (1996)
Blakely v. Washington (2004)
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore (1996)
Board of Education v. Earls (2002)
Board of Regents v. Southworth (2000)
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett (2001)
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000)
Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation (1999)
Bush v. Gore (2001)
Bush v. Vera (1996)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison (1997)
Capitol Square Review Board v. Pinette (1995)
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)
Clinton v. City of New York (1998)
County of Sacramento v. Lewis (1998)
Demore v. Kim (2003)
Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc.
v. Federal Communications Commission (1996)
Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives
(1999)
Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004)
Ewing v. California (2003)
Federal Election Commission v. Colorado Republican Federal
Campaign Committee (2001)
Felker v. Turpin (1996)
Ferguson v. Charleston (2001)
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Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc. (1995)
Georgia v. Ashcroft (2003)
Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001)
Gratz v. Bollinger (2003)
Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004)
Harris v. United States (2002)
Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court (2004)
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of
Boston (1995)
Illinois v. Wardlow (2000)
Immigration and Naturalization Services v. St. Cyr (2001)
Johnson v. California - No. 03-636 (2005)
Jones v. United States (1999)
Kansas v. Henderson (1997)
Kelo v. City of New London (2005)
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents (2000)
Kyllo v. United States (2001)
Lawrence v. Texas (2003)
Lindh v. Murphy (1997)
Locke v. Davey (2004)
Lockyer v. Andrade (2003)
Lorrillard Tobacco v. Reilley (2001)
McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union (2005)
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission (1995)
McKune v. Lile (2002)
Miller v. Johnson (1995)
Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)
Miller-El v. Dretke (2005)
Missouri v. Jenkins (1995)
Mitchell v. Helms (2000)
National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley (1998)
Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs (2003)
Nike v. Kasky (2003)
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government Pac (2000)
O'Dell v. Netherland (1997)
O'Neal v. McAninch (1995)
Penry v. Johnson (2001)
Raines v. Byrd (1997)
Rasul v. Bush (2004)
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Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union (1997)
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White (2002)
Rice v. Cayetano (2000)
Ring v. Arizona (2002)
Romer v. Evans (1996)
Rompilla v. Beard (2005)
Roper v. Simmons (2005)
Rumsfeld v. Padilla (2004)
Saenz v. Roe (1999)
Sandin v. Connor (1995)
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000)
Schiro v. Summerlin (2004)
Seminole Tribe v. Florida (1996)
Shaw v. Hunt (1996)
State Farm v. Campbell (2003)
Stenberg v. Carhart (2000)
Swidler & Berline v. United States (1998)
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency (2002)
Tennessee v. Lane (2004)
Troxel v. Granville (2000)
U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton (1995)
United States v. American Library Association (2003)
United States v. Drayton (2002)
United States v. Lopez (1995)
United States v. Morrison (2000)
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group (2000)
United States v. United Foods (2001)
United States v. Ursery (1996)
United States v. Virginia (1996)
Vacco v. Quill (1997)
Van Orden v. Perry (2005)
Veith v. Jubelirer (2004)
Vermont Agency of National Resources v. United States ex rel
Stevens (2000)
Vernonia School District v. Acton (1995)
Virginia v. Black (2003)
Washington v. Glucksberg (1997)
Watchtower Bible & Tract Society v. Village of Stratton (2002)
Wiggins v. Smith (2003)
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Williams v. Taylor - No. 99-6615 (2000)
Williams v. Taylor - No. 98-8384 (2000)
Wilson v. Layne (1999)
Wyoming v. Houghton (1999)
Zadvydas v. Davis (2001)
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)
